

eadquartered in Fort Belvoir, Va., U.S. Army Materiel Command has a presence in 49 states and 127 countries worldwide. Manning these organizations is a workforce of more than 67,000 dedicated military and civilian employees, many with highly developed specialties in weapons development, manufacturing, and logistics. AMC develops, delivers, and sustains materiel to ensure a dominant joint force for the U.S. and our allies. In layman's terms, "if a soldier shoots it, drives it, flies it, wears it, communicates with it, or eats it, AMC provides it."

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Army Lt. Gen. James H. Pillsbury assumed the duties as AMC's deputy commanding general on Dec. 8, 2008. Retired Army colonel Jim Oman, director of the DAU Senior Service College Fellowship Program and former commander, Army Forces Central Command-Saudi Arabia, met with Pillsbury in July to talk about how transformation has affected AMC, and how the command is tackling the challenges associated with the massive reset efforts under way. The Army has aggressively reset and repaired more than 500,000 pieces of equipment in our industrial base over the last six years, a workload three times greater than during the Vietnam War. In 2009 alone, AMC reset 180,000 pieces of equipment, including more than 400 aircraft, 2,700 tracked vehicles, and 150,000 weapons. As Pillsbury likes to remind people, the transformed AMC is "not your father's AMC."

O

You currently serve as the deputy commander of the organization that serves as the Army's premier provider of materiel readiness—everything from technology, acquisition, support, materiel development, logistics power projection, and sustainment. Can you please give us an overview of AMC and how the command has changed to better meet the needs of the warfighter?

A

This is not your father's AMC. It certainly was in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, when the Army was churning in the post-Vietnam era. AMC was a huge organization then, upwards of 220,000 to 240,000 people, mostly civilians. It's now down to a little more than 67,000, mostly civilians and about 1,300 military. It's an organization that spans tactical, operational, and strategic logistics and everything that is covered in those three areas. The transformation of AMC has been rapid in the last eight or nine years, primarily because of the war.

When Gen. [Paul J.] Kern was in command of AMC, [October 2001 to November 2004], he started creating organizations that have become known as Army field support brigades or AFSBs. The brigade commander is really our face to the tactical commander. There are seven 0-6—full colonel—commands worldwide: two in each theater, one in Afghanistan, and one in Iraq; three in CONUS [continental United States]; one in Korea; and one in Germany. They are able to reach back into the wholesale logistics world and bring to bear the wholesale logistics to a tactical or operational requirement.

Something that has happened very recently, just a few years ago, as a result of the Gansler Commission [the 2007 Gansler Commission Report, "The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations"] is the stand up of the Army Contracting Command. As a result, the Army Contracting Command has seven contracting support brigades worldwide, similar

geographically to the Army field support brigades. They are doing the contracting oversight for the combatant commanders—a huge investment of time and talent.

We have also taken into the fold, in a direct relationship, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, which is the Army service component command of U.S. Transportation Command; and again their brigades are throughout the world.

On top of those organizations is the Army Sustainment Command, a two-star command out of Rock Island Arsenal, III., that has control of the field support brigades I mentioned before. That command is the U.S. Army Division Support Command, the primary support command under the Army's old divisional structure. As you were growing up, we had the support commands—we had the division or the corps. We've lost that capability. And so the management of materiel and the equipping are now centered in Rock Island. On top of those commands are our functional commands: our Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, CECOM Life Cycle Management Command, Joint Munitions Command; then tying the technology together is the Research, Development and Engineering Command in Aberdeen, Md.

We have a dotted line to the chemical munitions agencies. They are destroying all the chemical stockpiles by treaty, and they are on track. We have several other smaller agencies, such as the Logistics Support Agency down in Hunstville, Ala. On Tuesdays, we have a worldwide video teleconference, where the 0-6 commanders brief us on what is going on in their footprint. We have people from Mongolia to the Democratic Republic of Congo to people in theater. It's a breathtaking organization and it is only going to get better with time.

Q

I had the opportunity a while ago to sit in on one of the video teleconferences and it was enlightening. I had no idea that the support structure—the exoskeleton—was out there performing the various functions. It was, as you said, breathtaking to see the breadth of all the various commands out there. From what I can tell, it certainly makes a huge difference in responsiveness, in getting the capabilities rapidly out to the warfighter.

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I am going to take it one step further. Within this transformation is an ongoing initiative, agreed to by the IMCOM [U.S. Army Installation Management Command] commander, Lt. Gen. [Rick] Lynch, and the AMC commanding general, Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody, in that the DOLs—directorates of logistics—at posts, camps, or stations will now become part of AMC. From above the motor pool to the depot, maintenance operations—our core competency—will be managed by AMC.

Q

Why has the Army transitioned to an enterprise management approach, and what is AMC's role in the Army's materiel enterprise?

A

You know, the leadership of our Army, both military and civilian—Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey, Secretary of the Army John McHugh, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Peter W. Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army Joseph W. Westphal—are trying hard to bring a businesslike atmosphere to the Army. It is a huge business. The chief, the previous secretary of the Army [Pete Geren] and the current secretary agreed to go down a path of core enterprises. There is a Readiness Core Enterprise that is headed by Forces Command, who are the customer. We are the ones who are going to provide them the necessary assets so that they can get forces trained and ready for combatant commanders.

There is the Human Capital Core Enterprise, jointly operated by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and

It's been recognized by the senior leadership of Forces Command, the senior leadership of the Department [of the Army], and the senior leadership of AMC that we have got to get back into a better supply discipline posture.

M&RA [Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs], and the Services and Infrastructure Core Enterprise, obviously IMCOM and ACSIM [Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management] respectively—and there is the Materiel Enterprise, that Dr. Malcolm O'Neill [Assistant Secretary of the Army (AT&L)] and Gen. Dunwoody are steering.

So what are we trying to do? We are trying to bring under one umbrella the entire lifecycle of the weapons system—the Blackhawk helicopter, for example—from the time that first UH-60 was in testing until the time we get rid of it, whenever that is. At present the entire lifecycle is owned in several areas. So from cradle to grave, let's get together with the acquisition and the sustainment communities and manage the lifecycle. That's what both Gen. Dunwoody and Dr. O'Neill are trying to get at. It's a culture change, and there are some clashes, some rice bowls that are going to be shattered; but the bottom line is that we are trying to do the right thing by the taxpayer and the warfighter.

C

You talked a little bit about the culture. Do you have challenges with the various branches that have the ownership, if you will, of the various weapons systems?

A

Not so much that. What has happened is that in the early part of the war, because we weren't as flexible as we needed to be after 9/11, the Pentagon absorbed the execution of several functions. What the chief wants to do is divorce the execution function from the Department of the Army, make that a policy and resourcing operation, and let the 4-star commands do the execution.

What do I mean by that? The management of equipping is done by the G-8 [U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8]. The G-8 decides whether a tank or a Blackhawk or a truck goes here or there. So let's give that to the Materiel Enterprise—let the Materiel Enterprise be the equipping manager. Let the Army Sustainment Command be that materiel manager. Give them the policies and priorities of the Department of the Army and let us execute that mission rather than have it be executed within the walls of the Pentagon. The Navy has been very successful, at least on the Naval Air Systems Command side, in allowing the execution arms on the naval aviation side (both the NA-VAIR and Airboss, the two 3-stars) execute their aviation strategy, and letting the Department of the Navy resource them. We are going down that road. It's just a matter of how fast and how many bumps we go over.

Q

Several years ago, I had the opportunity to go to one of the Wednesday morning staff briefs where the chief or the vice took the briefing from the staff, and the thing I walked away with at that particular time was it appeared that it was a very

centralized focus on the now rather than trying to do the long range.

That's a great point and a great take-away, and something I should have mentioned earlier. Because the Department of the Army is executing the war, who is doing that long-range planning? Who is doing that divisionary piece? Let us execute: That is our job, our core function. Let those men and women in the Pentagon do the big-brain work.

As the Army realigns core competencies and resources into the four core enterprises, how is this affecting AMC?

No core enterprise of the four can operate independently of the others. We take the demand signal from Forces Command. We operate on installations that the Services and Infrastructure Core Enterprise runs. So across the core enterprise is this integration that is absolutely key. It is done at several levels. One is obviously at the Army Enterprise Board—the 4-star—level, and then there are 3-star sessions, 2-star sessions, and on down into the 0-6 level.

As an example, because I mentioned the DOL, we have got the DOLs now, not because we are trying to build empires, but because that's part of our core competency, which is logistics. We also have 25 installations that we run. That isn't our core competency, it's services. We have a pilot with two government-owned, government-operated installations and two government-owned, contractor-operated installations that the Services and Infrastructure Core Enterprise will run at zero-sum gain, where it makes sense.

As I mentioned before, we have taken the DOLs. When you were in the Army and you went to Fort Benning, Ga., or if you were Air Defense, and you went to Fort Bliss, Texas, to basic and advanced courses, the fleet of air defense weapons

systems was managed and maintained by the school—not their core competency. It is now managed by AMC at a much lower cost and a much higher readiness rate.

Have you seen any challenges trying to synchronize resources as you look at ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] and trying to tie that all together? It seems that there would be significant challenges requiring a lot of brain power to synchronize and integrate the entire effort.

I went to a reset session yesterday with the Army Sustainment Command, with each of the AFSBs and the lifecycle management guys. We went down every unit that is in reset and every piece of equipment of every unit that is going through reset. And for equipment that wasn't at the right level of operational readiness, our folks knew, with very specific detail, what needed to happen to make it right. This detailed level of accountability is what we go through to support the AR-FORGEN.

ARFORGEN works, especially in this environment of constant rotations. Will it work when we get to a steady state peacetime—again? I don't know; somebody smarter than I has to figure that out. But it's working now, and the reason it's working is because Congress has resourced us to do it. As the chief says, if you can't run an Army on \$250 billion a year, something is wrong.

The reset effort in Iraq and in Afghanistan is requiring a great deal of resources and strategic effort, as we know. What is AMC's role in the resetting of equipment?

The chief has given the CG, Gen. Dunwoody, the mission to reset the Army. Now, that is "reset" in small letters. All caps "RESET" literally is the Army—people, installations, equipment. The small reset is the equipment. The general takes that very seriously.

Specifically addressing the stuff coming out of Iraq and very soon Afghanistan, Gen. Dunwoody has asked me to lead an organization that we've named the Responsible Reset Task Force, a very small 30- to 40-person cell that sits at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. In fact, I'm going over there in a couple of weeks for an extended period of time. As we help ARCENT [Third Army/U.S. Army Central] carry out their mission, all we are is a catcher's mitt for those items that are not needed in Iraq, ARCENT, and the CENTCOM area, and that need to come back to a source of repair. The pieces of equipment are going to come back to any number of those sources of



repair, obviously centered around depots for aviation down at Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas; trucks at Red River Army Depot, Texas; tracks at Anniston Army Depot, Ala.; communications and electronic gear up at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.; and Letterkenny Army Depot, Pa., does a little bit of wheels, Patriots, Force Providers, and so on.

Again, these are not your father's depots. There were 45 public-sector Shingo Awards given out from 2005 to 2009 and AMC won 26 of them. Letterkenny won an award during each of those years. No other organization can say that. Before 9/11, we were pumping out 20, 25 humvees [HMMWV—high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle] a week at Red River Army Depot in Texas. We are doing one every 16 minutes now. Just hold onto that thought for a minute. If you go down to Red River, you will see a pulse line, and every 16 minutes, a humvee moves down the line. There are nine stations along the line. It is just incredible to see. When you have the resources, you can do wonderful things.

Our depots are taking the stuff that is not needed from Iraq and the CENTCOM area and starting to fill the holes back in the units. As you well know, when the first units went over, they took all their kit and they left it behind when they came back, so we have a lot of theater-provided equipment over there. As we are drawing down, we are bringing that stuff back, and it needs to be fixed because it has been ridden hard and hung up wet.

The CG gave us some very clear guidance: Get accountability, which we—the Army— didn't have. We do now. Get visibility. We didn't have it; we do now. Get that stuff moving: velocity. We are doing that. And we triage the equipment as far forward as we can so that good disposition instructions can be given. Maybe that FOB [forward operating base]-running truck doesn't need to go to Red River Army Depot; maybe it just needs to go to the DOL and get a good 10/20 [maintenance term meaning all parts are in working order] done on it. Those are the tenets that this R2TF [Responsible Reset Task Force] under Jack Dugan [former TACOM deputy commander] has taken on.

Q

It seems you take a tremendous amount of pressure off 3rd Army over there, having that type of resource, a catcher's mitt, if you will. Do you help with your expertise, in trying to prioritize and make recommendations to 3rd Army and CENTCOM?

A

Our R2TF has a seat at the table. We are embedded in Lt. Gen. [William G.] Webster's [commander, Third Army/U.S. Army Central] organization. We coach, mentor, and teach; we take orders. We drive on with his intent as it relates to the responsible drawdown. It is really a huge team effort and I've got to tell you, Lt. Gen. Webster listens also. When Jack Dugan and the team mention something to him, he takes it as he would input from one of his staff and acts on it accordingly.

O

One of the places you mentioned was the Letterkenny Army Depot. I run the Senior Service College Fellowship for the Department of the Army Civilians at Aberdeen Proving Ground, and in October 2009, I took my fellows to Letterkenny. The thing I walked away with was the unique commercial governmental partnerships.

A

We have dozens of partnerships throughout our depots, where the prime contractor or the original equipment manufacturer will come in with their expertise, and we'll provide the bricks and mortar and labor. They get world-class quality artisanship without having to sink cost into physical facilities, and we get the revenue from it, so it is a win-win situation.

A great example of partnership is the T-700 Turbine Engine line at Corpus Christi [Army Depot, Texas], for the UH-60s—the Blackhawk helicopters—and the 64s—the Apache helicopters. Six years ago, it used to take more than 300 days to recap an engine. Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command entered into a partnership with GE, and the partnership said GE will provide 100 percent of the parts, 100 percent of the time, at the point where the artisan needs them on the line. It went from 300-plus days to 68 days. Now you tell me how many engines we don't need when we have the turnaround time like that at the supply chain. We saved hundreds of millions of dollars that way.

Q

Would you address how AMC is using its reset experience to help execute the drawdown of equipment in Iraq and build up in Afghanistan? You touched on it earlier.

Α

Yes, I'll expand on that. Part of the catcher's mitt is that if something is needed somewhere else in CENTCOM for example, if a truck is coming out of theater-provided equipment in Iraq and is needed in force packages on the surge—we send it to a refurb operation; not a reset, but a good 10/20 operation. In Kuwait, we have a contractor for light-, medium-, and heavy-wheeled vehicles; we have a forward repair activity for communications equipment, C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], and then we help the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command ship the equipment to Afghanistan where it is married up at our AFSB at the 401st in Bagram Air Force Base, and the team there will then populate the wheel with the current configuration requested by the theater. It really is Ph.D.-level logistics.

C

Can you continue to track it—do you have in-transit visibility as the equipment moves along?

A

You know, it takes 17 days to go through the northern route through Pakistan, 12 days to go the southern route. Once the piece of equipment gets off the boat at Karachi, no American touches it—it is all contract because of the political situation in Pakistan. So do we have visibility? Yes. Is there pilferage? Yes. You've seen the pictures and damage.

Q

Are there lessons that you are learning as you go along that you can plow back in and improve the process?

A

Yes; we'd be remiss if we didn't learn from our experience. We all do. As an example, we have not used a tank or a Bradley [infantry fighting vehicle] in anger lately in Iraq; so

why are we sending them back to depot for repair? We are taking a look at that.

We are also taking a look at one of the bigger challenges, which is non-standard equipment. The last data point I had was somewhere north of \$46 billion of nonstandard equipment. And what's the definition of NSE? It's something that's not on an MTOE [modified table of organization and equipment]. It is a result of the wonderful resourcing that Congress has given us, and the ability to take a commander's requirement and turn it into something necessary. We've taken

that NSE and given it to the warfighter, and then what? Well, we are supposed to pick it up on the property book, but it didn't always make it there. So all items that are on that FOB that aren't unit equipment are being looked at by our teams, and if they are not on the property book, they are brought to record. That is how we know we have \$46 billion so far.

A lot of that stuff is a cell phone, a laptop computer, or something of that type. It may just get thrown away. But maybe that night vision piece or that radio that are not on an MTOE, needs to go back to Sierra Army Depot, Calif., and they can stock/store those pieces out there. What we don't have is dollars to repair them. Because it's non-standard equipment, it doesn't come with a budget line for sustainment, and that makes sense. But if it's in good shape and a customer wants it, give it to them! IMCOM has our list of NSE. Just last month, we got 1,700 items, valued at well over \$10 million, of force protection gear for our guard forces in

IMCOM. It's a win-win situation for the Army to make sure we take care of our nonstandard equipment.

Q

It always seemed to me that on the process you just mentioned, the Achilles heel is that you don't have the logistical tail to support it. It's great to get NSE out to the warfighter, but then how do you maintain it?

A

If we lose an airplane to

combat loss or accident, we

have the dollars to replace

it probably in the next year

and certainly within two

years. Congress and the

Department have been great

in providing resources.

Exactly—and then what? So the 101st takes over from the 82nd; do they even want that piece of equipment, or do they want something else? And as you well know, Moore's Law [named for Gordon E. Moore, cofounder of Intel, who described the trend in 1965] states that technology and computers refresh every 18 months. So I am buying lap-

tops now that aren't going to be needed 18 months from now. Yes, it's a challenge, but we are fighting a different war too. We are fighting in an operational environment that is nonstandard to begin with.

O

As the equipment is coming out of Iraq, where is it going and what needs to happen to it to ensure it's ready for the next mission? What is AMC's role in these efforts?

Δ

When a truck comes out of Iraq, it goes to Red River Army Depot. It gets in the queue and goes through the program and then it

comes out brand new, zero miles, zero hours, and it is ready to go to wherever it needs to go. That's the challenge we have right now.

There are holes in our formations in all components because there is theater-provided equipment. The prioritization the Pentagon gives the depots to get that stuff out and to a particular unit is very critical, and the synchronization is Ph.D. level. Each unit has an equipping synchronization board right as it goes into reset, and then the timeline for that MTOE is laid out.

Now that being said, the chief challenged Gen. Dunwoody to come up with a better way to manage and distribute our equipment. At present, the Army has no single integrator of materiel. Multiple managers such as Army G-8, G-4, G-3, the Reserve component, program executive offices, the medical community, AMC and others have a hand in

the process. By establishing a lead materiel integrator we can optimize materiel management and synchronize the "demand" signal from the Readiness Enterprise with the Materiel Enterprise to drive equipment flow. We're running a pilot later on this month at Rock Island to compare alternatives to the current way of doing business. The goal is to influence a cultural change in Army equipping business practices to become more efficient, increase readiness, and save taxpayer dollars.

O

Do you provide the interface and have any dealings with the host nation as we try to transfer some of the equipment over to the Iraqis and Afghans?

A

Yes; obviously, through foreign military sales and pseudoforeign military sales, we are tied tight with USF-I and CSTC-A, [U.S. Forces-Iraq and Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan respectively] those two acronyms that stand for helping to equip the two nations, their police and military. We have a very close relationship. As they need a piece of kit and we can help provide it, we will. We are doing that now with humvees for Afghanistan.

Q

Asset visibility and accountability are critical to success, but they have always created challenges for our Army. How is AMC leveraging new technologies to continue to improve things in this area?

Δ

One of the things that AMC did back in 2006 and 2007 was start an initiative called "left-behind equipment" or LBE. When 10th Mountain Division left Afghanistan, the division commander, then- Lt. Gen. Benjamin Freakley, called AMC and said, "I need somebody to take the equipment we're not taking with us and maintain it for a year."

So we started this process, and it has grown. Part of the reset process I got last week from Rock Island was an LBE brief. Each unit gave us some equipment. That equipment is being maintained by a 10/20 standard while the unit is gone, and in some cases, the equipment is being transferred to fill holes for the next deployers. There are 10,000 lateral transfers for one year at Fort Hood—I don't know if that is good or bad, but it is a lot.

Q

It's got to represent a huge savings if you are able to transfer equipment as people are coming in, then they aren't shipping it.

A

Yes, indeed; however, I think the more important factor is we are allowing the next-to-deploy commander the ability to train.

So we are managing left-behind equipment better, but that doesn't directly answer your question about property accountability. We have fallen somewhat behind on that. We're conducting what used to be called a "report of survey" back when I was still down in motor pools. It's now called a FLIPL or financial liability investigation of property loss. Rock Island now has teams in Iraq and they are getting serial number items in and have recovered hundreds of millions of dollars of FLIPL materiel that was being written off. That's the challenge the boss gave us, and AMC is producing. Are we there yet? I would say we are pretty close, not only with standard equipment, but with nonstandard equipment too. As you know, we didn't know how much we had, and now we have a baseline.

It's been recognized by the senior leadership of Forces Command, the senior leadership of the Department, and the senior leadership of AMC that we have got to get back into a better supply discipline posture.

Q

Do you still see the same amount of turbulence Stateside with trying to maintain accountability, whether it's MTOE left behind or TDA—table of distribution and allowances—left behind, things of that nature?

A

I am not sure. Let's take Fort Hood, for example, and our 407th AFSB. Four or five months after a unit's return date, we start to reissue them the equipment that they left behind, and it's going to be complete and in good working condition. We will have taken their unit equipment and reset it, from small arms to gas masks to radios to vehicles to tracks, and we give them a set of complete kit. I think that at least at that point in time, property accountability is in pretty good shape. What I am concerned with is back in the theater. Is property accountability priority number one there? No. Should it be? No! But can we do better? I think we can.

Q

Have you had significant challenges with battle losses?

A

Fewer than you might think. Every loss is terrible, of course, especially if a soldier is involved, but the resources have been very good. On the aviation side, if we lose an airplane to combat loss or accident, we have the dollars to replace it probably in the next year and certainly within two years. Congress and the Department have been great in providing resources.

O

I've enjoyed this conversation with you, Sir. Thank you for your time.